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DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING RESULTING FROM
MISTREATMENT OF A CADAVER
THE RECOVERY of damages for mental disturbance is usually limited
to those instances in which the suffering is a reasonable and natural
consequence of a physical or pecuniary injury to the plaintiff.1 How-
ever, damages are recoverable for mental suffering resulting from the
mistreatment of dead bodies notwithstanding the absence of physical or
pecuniary injury to the plaintiff.2 Abuse of a cadaver invades the so-
called quasi-property right3 which exists in the surviving spouse or next
of kin for the purpose of burial.4 The infringement of this right is a
breach of duty or contract.5 Recovery of damages is usually denied,
however, when the injury is caused merely by negligence, unaccom-
panied by wilful or wanton conduct.
A recent California case, Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mor-
tuary,7 is one of a small minority of cases which does not require proof
of wilful or wanton conduct to recover damages for mental suffering
resulting from the mistreatment of dead bodies.8 In that case the
X IS AM. JUR. Dead Bodies § 35 (1938)-
'Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).25 C.J.S. Dead Bodies § z (i941). The authorities are almost uniform in holding
that there is no property right in a strict sense, or in the ordinary use of the term, in
the dead body of a human being. After burial the body becomes a part of the ground
to which it is committed. JACKSON, LAW OF CADAVERS 133 (2d ed. i95o). See
PROSSER, ToRTs § ix (2d ed. 1955) ; Note, 2 ARK. L. REV. 124 (1948).
'Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891) (where the court talked in
terms of a "sacred trust").
The general rule that there can be no recovery for mental disturbance for the
breach of a contract, was discarded by the court in the case of a mortician where the
parties contracted with the reference to feelings and sentiments and knew that peculiar
mental disturbance would result from a breach. Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App.
33 (1915). Contra, Archer v. Continental Assur. Co., 107 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ky.
1952); Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 1o2 N.W. 40 (1905).
" Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (94); Plummer v. Hollis, 213
Ind. 43, 11 N.E.2d 140 (1937); Beaulieu v. Great No. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 1x N.W.
353 (1o97); Nail v. McCullough, 88 Okla. 243, 212 Pac. 981 (923) ; Grill v. Abele
Funeral Home, Inc., 69 Ohio App. 5i, 42 N.E.zd 788 (1940) ; Nichols v. Central Vt.
Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 1o9 AUt. 905 (1919). RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 868 (939).
1335 P.2d 181 (Cal. z959).
8Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 68 S.W. 433 (19o2); Wells, Fargo.
& Co. Express v. Fuller, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 61o, 35 S.W. 824 (1896). A widow
recovered from the railroad for the negligent misdelivery of the body of her hus-
band in Hale v. Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S.W. 6o5 (i892). In Brown Funeral
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plaintiffs recovered damages for the mental disturbance they experienced
when the defendant-morticians negligently failed properly to embalm
their father's body for burial in a distant city.
Generally, recovery for the mental suffering caused by injuries to
personal and domestic security, such as breach of promise to marry,
false imprisonment, or libel, is facilitated because the requisite element
of malice or wantonness is presumed." In contrast, most courts continue
to require definite allegations and proof of malice for recovery for
wrongful acts committed against a dead body."0 The usual rationale is
that in mere negligence there is intent neither to offer indignity to the
corpse nor to wound the feelings of the plaintiff11 Furthermore, men-
tal disturbance is deemed so remote and beyond ordinary probabilities
that no proximate, causal relationship exists between the defendant's
negligence and the alleged injury.12
If actions sounding in contract are brought, the majority of cases
hold that there can be no recovery"' because the mental disturbance is
deemed to be neither foreseeable nor in the minds of the parties when
the contract was made. 4 Some jurisdictions, however, reason that
those who derive profit from preparing the dead for burial should be
Home & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. zS4 (x933), and Taylor v. Bear-
den, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33 (qxx5), an embalmer owing only ordinary skill was held
liable for negligent and unskillful embalming. Contra, Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. x8z,
200 So. 541 (94.1) 5 Beaulieu v. Great No. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (907).
However, note the dissenting opinion in Beaulieu v,. Great No. Ry., supra, where it was
felt that mere negligence was sufficient grounds to recover "sentimental" damages.
'Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 5x (1913). In Larson v. Chase,
47 Minn. 307, 310, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (1891), the court pointed out that substantial
damages could be recovered in a class of torts where the only injury suffered was
mental: "That mental suffering and injury to the feelings would be ordinarily the
natural and proximate result of knowledge that the remains of a deceased husband had
been mutilated is too plain to admit of argument."
"0Hall v. Jackson, supra note 95 Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, z00 So. 541
(i94i) ; Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925).
"Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 Ad. 273 (1927).
"Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 132 Pac. 1x (913) ; Dunahoo v. Bess,
146 Fla. 182, zoo So. 541 (x94i). Recovery was denied for a mortician's breach of
contract in failing to take a photograph of the plaintiff's deceased infant child for the
purpose of preserving the memory of the child in Plummer v. Hollis, 213 Ind. 43 ,
it N.E.zd 140 (x937).
"Dunahoo v. Bess, supra note 12.
"'Ibid. Accord, Grill v. Abele Funeral Home, Inc., 69 Ohio App. 5x, 42 N.E.2d
788 (194o), in which the plaintiff was denied recovery for negligent breach of contract
when he failed to prove that the defendant-mortician's employees "maliciously" snatched
jewelry from the body of his dead wife prior to burial. The defendant was guilty only
of a violation of instructions or a mere breach of contract for which the plaintiff suf-
fered only mental disturbance which was insufficient for recovery.
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especially aware of the deep emotional ramifications of their conduct.15
Thus, mental suffering is considered foreseeable"6 and the proximate
result of any breach of duty or contract.17  These courts view any indig-
nity to a dead body, intentional or negligent, as, by its very nature,
sufficient ground of recovery in contract for resulting mental anguish."
There are exceptional areas in the law of cadavers where courts,
which normally require a showing of wilfulness, allow recovery for mere
negligent infliction of mental disturbance. The so-called "Texas rule, 19
for example, permits recovery for mental anguish resulting from the
negligent mishandling of telegraphic death messages.20  An extension
of the "Texas rule" has also found some acceptance in cases of negligent
misdelivery or mistreatment of a dead body by common carriers. 21
The basic rationale of the telegraph and common-carrier decisions
is that, since the parties contract with full awareness of the peculiar
emotional and sentimental elements associated with transactions con-
cerning dead bodies, no showing of conduct exceeding mere negligence
is necessary. Such considerations seem .no less compelling in the case
of a contract with a mortician for the preparation of a body for burial.22
" Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 57 o , 68 S.W. 433, 435 (igoz). The
law awards damages for mental disturbance caused by a breach of contract, since in the
case of a dead body the parties contracted with respect to sentiments and feelings, "or
at least have contracted with respect to those things which naturally affect the feelings
and emotions." In Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33 (191S), the court found
that the parties contracted with reference to feelings and sentiments, and knew that
severe mental disturbance would result from a breach. See also, Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal.
ad 480, 196 P.2d 9i5 (z948).
" Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 186 Atl. 585 (1936). Here
the court found that a negligent act in burying the deceased, when the family was over
one-half hour late, was in effect utter disregard for the feelings of others amounting to
recklessness.
"'Sanford v. Ware, x91 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d io (195o).
", Brown Funeral Home & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 2z6 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154 0933);
Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.zd 9x5 (s948) 5 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hull,
113 Ky. 561, 68 S.W. 433 (1902).
"Renihan v. Wright, izS Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 8a (i89o). But cf., Dunahoo v.
Bess, 146 Fla. 1SZ, 2oo So. 541 (5945), where the court rejected the theory after
reviewing its historical development.
"' Jackson, op. cit. supra note 3, at zso. These cases also represent a strong excep-
tion to the rule which denies recovery for mental disturbance caused by a breach of
contract. See note 14 supra.
"Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 56x, 68 S.W. 433 (9o2); Wells, Fargo &
Co. Express v. Fuller, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 610, 35 S.W. 824. (1896).
". Brown Funeral Home & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, z26 Ala. 661, x4-8 So. 154 (x933)
Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33 (1915). Justice Pound said in his concur-
ring opinion: "An indignity to the dead is an offense to the living." Finley v. Atlantic
Transp. Co., 22o N.Y. 249, 259, 115 N.E. 715, 718 (1917).
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The traditional approach requiring a positive showing of wilfulness
or wantonness2 3 in this class of cases is unrealistic. 24 The majority view
is often justified by raising the spectre of fraudulent daims. 21 It seems
obvious, however, that the usual dose kinship and sentimental attach-
ment of the plaintiff to the loved-one whose remains are violated insure
the existence of genuine mental disturbance and greatly obviate the
danger of feigned claims.2" Accordingly, many courts, when faced with
mere negligent conduct and with precedents embodying the traditional
approach, nonetheless allow recovery by resorting to legal fictions 7 and
judicial niceties. 8
The traditional approach concerning dead bodies represents a defi-
nite inadequacy in the law for the recovery of damages for mental dis-
" See note 6 supra.
"Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913). All that the court
would do was suggest a legislative enactment to allow a recovery for mere negligence.
"And we think it may be safely laid down as a general rule that an injury to any right
recognized and protected by the common law [referring to the quasi-property right in
the next of kin for purposes of burial] will, if the direct and proximate consequence
of an actionable wrong, be a subject for compensation." Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn.
307, 310, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891).
"Cf., Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (93); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., i5i N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (x896) (at common law, claims based on
mental disturbance wore the badge of fraud).
1' See note 9 supra.
27 Renihan v. Wright, iz5 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822 (189o). Here the defendant-
mortician negligently allowed the body of an infant child to be buried in a spot un-
known to himself. When the parties asked where their child was, he answered, "Your
child is in Ohio." The court allowed recovery for mental disturbance for breach of a
-contract of bailment. Obviously this is a judicial fiction since only property can be
bailed. Other courts go no further than recognizing a quasi-property right in the
corpse which is in itself a fiction, as the property right did not exist while the decedent
is living, cannot be conveyed, has no pecuniary value, and has only one purpose-
burial, which actually is a source of liability to the next of kin.
"In Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 AUt. 273 (1927), the defendant's act
amounted to transferring a corpse from one coffin to a smaller, but more expensive,
unselected coffin in order to insure prompt delivery for burial. The railroad could not
accept the selected larger coffin in the absence of a shipping box which at that time was
unavailable and thus the reason for the exchange. The plaintiff was charged no in-
crease in price, but still recovered for mental anguish, since the jury found a gross
indignity was heaped upon the deceased. In Mensinger v. O'Hara, 189 Ill. App. 48
(1914), the plaintiff was allowed to recover for wilfulness because fortunately he
did not allege mere negligence in the declaration. The court inferred wilfulness from
the complaint. See Sworski v. Simons, 208 Minn. 20e, 293 N.W. 309 (940), where
compensation was awarded to decedent's parents when a coroner acting under the
_alleged authority of a statute had the deceased embalmed. It was held that the statute
was not a defense, for it required that the deceased be an unknown person, and the
evidence tended to show that there was sufficient identification upon the body for the
coroner to have discovered its identity.
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turbance. This inadequacy would best be remedied by a frank admis-
sion that negligent mutilation or indignity to human remains is sui
generis"2 and damages for mental disturbance should be awarded with-
out proof of aggravated misconduct.Y0 Total abandonment of the
anachronistic traditional approach would be a realistic and salutary
innovation.81
"Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33 (1915).
"0Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. io, 55 S.E.zd So (1949) (the contract being
so personal in nature, the contractual duty or obligation is so coupled with matters of
mental concern or solicitude, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or reasonably
result in mental suffering). See Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1939] z K.B. 394. (C.A.
1938) (where defendant's servants negligently overturned a hearse and the relatives of
the deceased recovered for mental distrubance even though they did not see the accident).
81 cBut I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it
ought not to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed. I think that when a
rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with
the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank
avowal and full abandonment." CARnOzo, THE NAUaRE OF THE JUDICIAL PRoCEss 1So
(1g92).
